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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past six years, the United States Supreme Court has 
carved out a distinct jurisprudential approach to youth. In 2005, 
the Court abolished the death penalty for juveniles in Roper v. 
Simmons.1 Then the Court ruled that juveniles could no longer 
be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for non-
homicide offenses in Graham v. Florida.2 Roper and Graham 
changed the national conversation about the culpability of minors 
who engage in criminal acts. As a result of these two cases, 
which embraced the scientific evidence revealing fundamental 
differences between juvenile and adult minds, juveniles can no 
longer be classified among the worst offenders, deserving of the 
most serious punishment.3 The magnitude of Roper and Graham 
is equal in significance to the Supreme Court’s extension of due 
process rights to children in the 1967 landmark case, In re 
Gault. As important as Roper and Graham are in their own 
right, collectively they pave the way for more meaningful due 
process protections for children adjudicated in the criminal 
justice system.4   
One year after Graham, the Court handed down J.D.B. v. 
North Carolina, completing what could be considered a trilogy 
of Supreme Court cases that forge a new approach to youth 
status in our justice system. For the first time, the Supreme 
Court applied Roper, Graham, and recent adolescent 
development research to a context other than the Eighth 
Amendment.  
In her majority opinion in J.D.B., Justice Sotomayor grasped 
the significance of age in her common-sense approach to 
                                                          
1 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
2 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010). 
3 See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (“No recent data provide reason to 
reconsider the Court’s observations in Roper about the nature of 
juveniles . . . developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”); Roper, 543 
U.S. at 569 (“Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and 
adults demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified 
among the worst offenders.”). 
4 See infra Part IV. 
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Miranda custody determinations. J.D.B. was a thirteen-year-old 
student interrogated by a police detective in the principal’s office 
of the boy’s middle school.5 As the Court noted, if it were to 
ignore J.D.B.’s age in the custody analysis, as precedent 
mandated, it would be forced to evaluate how a reasonable adult 
would feel when removed from his seventh grade social studies 
class, brought to the principal’s office, interrogated by a police 
detective, and warned of detention in a juvenile facility if he 
failed to cooperate.6 That makes little sense, as either a practical 
or legal matter.  
In J.D.B., the Court held that age is a relevant factor in 
determining whether a juvenile is in custody for Miranda 
purposes.7 Drawing from prior cases, including Roper and 
Graham, both premised on the “understanding that the 
differentiating characteristics of youth are universal,”8 a majority 
of the Court agreed that failing to consider age in the custody 
analysis would be nonsensical.9 Justice Sotomayor explained that 
age is far more “than a chronological fact”;10 it informs behavior 
and perception.11  
Looking to the future, with the specific attributes of children 
now firmly acknowledged in Supreme Court precedent, a 
qualitatively different analysis is possible for juveniles in a 
variety of contexts not yet considered by the Court. There are 
any number of scenarios, from pre-trial to disposition, that may 
                                                          
5 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011). 
6 Id. at 2407 (“[I]gnoring a juvenile defendant’s age will often make the 
[Miranda] inquiry more artificial . . . .”).  
7 Id. at 2399. 
8 Id. at 2404. 
9 Id. at 2405 (“Neither officers nor courts can reasonably evaluate the 
effect of objective circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to children 
without accounting for the age of the child subjected to those 
circumstances.”); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) 
(“A 16 year old and a 75 year old each sentenced to life without parole 
receive the same punishment in name only.”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 569 (2005) (distinguishing juvenile and adult offenders based on age and 
its implications). 
10 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 
104, 115 (1982)).   
11 See id. 
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require courts to approach the application of procedural and 
substantive criminal law differently to youth in juvenile and 
adult court proceedings. These include such matters as 
competency, self-defense, lack of mens rea, accomplice liability, 
voluntariness of waiver of rights, and suppression of physical 
evidence.12 This Article will address three separate areas where 
the Roper, Graham, J.D.B. trilogy may prove to have a 
profound impact: waiver of right to counsel, Terry stops,13 and 
the nature of the attorney-client relationship.14 In each of these 
contexts, various attributes of youth have differing effects on the 
doctrinal determination. For instance, if juveniles are 
characteristically impetuous decision makers, they may require 
additional protections to ensure that they are afforded a 
meaningful opportunity to be represented by a lawyer.15 
                                                          
12 See Marsha Levick, J.D.B. v. North Carolina: The U.S. Supreme 
Court Heralds the Emergence of the “Reasonable Juvenile” in American 
Criminal Law, 89 CRIM. L. REP. 753, 753 (2011) (offering a fuller 
discussion of how the Roper, Graham, J.D.B. trilogy opens the door to 
replacing the “reasonable person” standard with a “reasonable child” 
standard).   
13 Terry-type detentions are brief detentions of civilians predicated on 
reasonable and articulable suspicion. Police officers may stop and question a 
civilian to confirm or dispel an officer’s suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968). 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 The long-standing practice in some jurisdictions of children waiving 
counsel at arraignment and proceeding pro se may be curtailed after J.D.B. 
The most reliable way to ensure a juvenile is represented throughout the 
proceedings is to impose a non-waivable right to counsel. See IRA M. 
SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS OF 
THE CHILD 160–61 (Lexington Books 1st prtg. ed. 1989) (“Nonwaivable right 
to counsel is also important because of the research indicating that young 
juveniles as a class do not understand the nature and significance of their 
Miranda rights to remain silent and to counsel.”); Donna M. Bishop & 
Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent Development 
Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 125, 127 (2007); Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A 
Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 994 
(1995) (citing ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYS., MINN. 
SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT 5–11 (1994) (“The Study Committee 
recommended mandatory, non-waivable appointment of counsel for juveniles 
charged with felony or gross misdemeanor offenses, and in any proceeding 
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Likewise, considering age when assessing the reasonableness of 
whether a juvenile would feel free to terminate the encounter 
during a Terry stop may compel a different outcome after J.D.B. 
Finally, a juvenile’s difficulty in weighing long-term 
consequences against short-term gains could put him or her at a 
significant disadvantage in terms of the quality of the 
representation he or she receives.16 Though the extent of 
J.D.B.’s impact is currently unknowable, it has great potential to 
ensure a meaningful delivery of constitutional protections to 
children in the investigative and adjudicatory phases of 
proceedings.  Before exploring these possibilities in greater 
depth, Part I of this article briefly traces Supreme Court 
treatment of age of the suspect in Miranda custody 
determinations. Part II in turn discusses Roper and Graham and 
the foundation those decisions laid for construing age as an 
objective factor in the custody analysis. Part III addresses the 
relevance of juvenile cognitive and social functioning in 
custodial interrogations. Finally, Part IV addresses the potential 
for applying other constitutional rights afforded to juveniles in a 
manner inclusive of age and psychosocial development, as 
demonstrated by J.D.B. 
I. THE ABSENCE OF AGE AS A FACTOR IN THE SUPREME COURT’S 
CUSTODY ANALYSIS 
Before J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court had not 
definitively decided whether age is relevant in determining 
whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes. In 1966, 
the year Miranda was decided, the Court did not contemplate 
the implications of its holding for juveniles because Fifth 
Amendment protections were not extended to juveniles until a 
year later, in the landmark case of In re Gault.17 The Miranda 
custody analysis was consequently predicated upon the 
presumption that a reasonable adult would be the subject of 
                                                          
that may lead to out-of-home placement.”)). 
16 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010). 
17 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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interrogation,18 and the Court mandated consideration of 
whether, in light of the police conduct, a “reasonable person” in 
the suspect’s position would feel “at liberty to terminate the 
interrogation and leave.”19 The inquiry requires courts to 
examine objective factors present during the interrogation20 in 
order to avoid the unworkable task of requiring police to assess 
how a suspect’s unique personality traits may have affected his 
or her subjective state of mind.21 Although courts take into 
account the age of a suspect when assessing the voluntariness of 
statements and waiver of right against self-incrimination, age 
was not historically considered in the context of the Miranda 
custody analysis.22  
The Court came close to considering the relevance of age in 
assessing custody in Yarborough v. Alvarado.23 Michael 
Alvarado was seventeen and one half years old, with no criminal 
record.24 He was suspected of being involved in an attempted 
robbery and murder with another boy who was believed to be 
the shooter.25 Approximately one month following the shooting, 
                                                          
18 See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994); Oregon v. 
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977). 
19 Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). 
20 These include:  
(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that 
the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or 
request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not considered 
under arrest; (2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom 
of movement during the questioning; (3) whether the suspect initiated 
contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official request 
to respond to questions; (4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive 
stratagems were employed during questioning; (5) whether the 
atmosphere of the questioning was police dominated; or, (6) whether 
the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of the 
questioning.  
See United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990).  
21 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2402 (2011) (citing 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 430–31 (1984)). 
22 See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 
23 Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004).  
24 Id. at 656, 660. 
25 Id. at 656. 
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upon the request of police, Alvarado’s parents brought him to 
the police station.26 Without his parents present, police 
questioned him for two hours about an attempted robbery and 
murder.27 After initial denials, Alvarado eventually admitted that 
he was present and that he helped to hide the gun after the 
shooting.28 The police never gave Alvarado Miranda warnings.29 
The trial court found he was not in custody and convicted him 
of first degree murder.30 The State appeals court affirmed the 
lack of custody determination.31 
Alvarado filed a habeas corpus petition in which he claimed 
he was being held pursuant to a state court judgment predicated 
upon an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 
law.32 When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the 
custody issue presented in Alvarado, it endorsed a requirement 
for extra procedural safeguards when a juvenile is the subject of 
a police interrogation.33 It reasoned that, if a youth, by virtue of 
age and immaturity, is more susceptible to police coercion 
during a custodial interrogation, he is also more likely to believe 
that he is in custody in the first place.34 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari. 
Because the issue reached the Supreme Court in the context 
of a habeas proceeding, the Court applied the deferential 
standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), rather than review de 
novo whether Alvarado was in custody.35 The Court addressed 
the limited issue of whether the state court unreasonably applied 
clearly established law when it held that Alvarado was not in 
                                                          
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 657. 
29 Id. at 656. 
30 Id. at 658. 
31 People v. Soto, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
32 Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 655. 
33 Id. at 660 (citing Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 
2002)). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 655 (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 
1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006)). 
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custody.36 Because of the absence of Supreme Court precedent 
regarding age as a relevant factor in custody determinations, the 
Court ruled that the state trial court did not err when it denied 
consideration of age in its determination that Michael Alvarado 
was not in custody.37 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
reaffirmed the Court’s long-standing adherence to an objective 
custody test under Miranda.38   
Importantly, Alvarado did not foreclose consideration of age 
in the custody analysis; it merely held that such consideration is 
not a matter of clearly established federal law.39 Nonetheless, the 
decision caused some state courts to retreat from considering a 
suspect’s age when evaluating whether that juvenile was in 
custody. For instance, Iowa and Illinois, which had historically 
used age as a factor in considering whether a juvenile was in 
custody and thus deserving of Miranda warnings, ceased that 
practice in response to Alvarado.40 Similarly, states such as 
Wyoming, the District of Columbia, and North Carolina that 
had not previously decided whether age was a relevant 
consideration in custody determinations foreclosed consideration 
of age following Alvarado.41 
                                                          
36 Id. at 655; see also § 2254(d)(1). 
37 Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 668. Justice O’Connor was the swing vote. In 
her concurrence, she recognized that there may be instances where age 
should be a factor, but not in this case because Michael was merely six 
months shy of his eighteenth birthday. Id. at 669 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
38 Id. at 668 (majority opinion). 
39 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2405 (2011) (“Our prior 
decision in Alvarado in no way undermines these conclusions . . . . [W]e 
observed that accounting for a juvenile’s age in the Miranda custody analysis 
‘could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.’ We said nothing, 
however, of whether such a view would be correct under the law.” (citations 
omitted) (quoting Alvarado, 541 U.S. at 668)). 
40 See People v. Croom, 883 N.E.2d 681, 689 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) 
(“Given the . . . emphasis on objectiveness [in Alvarado], we decline to 
consider defendant’s age [sixteen] when determining whether he was in 
custody . . . .”); State v. Bogan, 774 N.W.2d 676, 681 n.1 (Iowa 2009) 
(“Previously, we . . . use[d] age as part of the analysis in determining a 
defendant’s custodial status. However, subsequent[ly] . . . the Supreme Court 
decided Yarborough v. Alvarado, which questions whether age is a factor to 
consider under a federal constitutional analysis.” (citations omitted)). 
41 See In re J.F., 987 A.2d 1168, 1175–76 (D.C. 2010) (declining to 
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In retrospect, it would have been premature for the Alvarado 
Court to reach the issue of whether age should be considered in 
determining whether a juvenile suspect is in custody. Because 
Michael Alvarado was almost an adult at seventeen and one half 
years old,42 the case did not present an ideal set of facts to 
encourage the Court to delve into the frailties and vulnerabilities 
of adolescence. Furthermore, the legal recognition that children 
are categorically different from adults did not exist at the time of 
Alvarado. Although the law treated youth differently from adults 
in some contexts,43 the foundation for recognizing the 
neurological and psychological differences between adolescents 
and adults in the criminal context was not laid until Roper v. 
Simmons.44 Roper was the first of a progression of cases relying 
on the age of the juvenile offender as grounds for a distinct 
approach toward the application of constitutional protections. 
Then, in Graham v. Florida, Justice Kennedy elaborated on the 
universal differences between children and adults.45 
                                                          
consider the age of J.F., a fourteen-year-old, because “the Supreme Court 
has not held that a suspect’s age . . . is relevant to the Miranda custody 
analysis,” and instead, considering that he “was never told that he was 
required to speak with the officers, he was not handcuffed, and he traveled to 
the station in an unmarked car with plainclothes officers” to determine that he 
was not in custody); In re W.R., 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (N.C. 2009) (applying 
the objective “reasonable person” standard to conclude that the fourteen-year-
old defendant was not in custody at the time of questioning while not 
considering the age of the juvenile); C.S.C. v. State, 118 P.3d 970, 978 
(Wyo. 2005) (holding that the age of a sixteen-year-old student suspect need 
not be considered in custody inquiry where the student was repeatedly told 
that he was not under arrest, was not obligated to answer questions, and 
could leave at any time). 
42 Alvarado, 541 U.S at 656. 
43 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283A (1965) (“If the 
actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid 
being negligent is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and 
experience under like circumstances.”). Military service is another example 
where the law treats youth differently than adults. See generally Military 
Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 451–73 (2006). 
44 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005). 
45 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010). 
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF ROPER AND GRAHAM TO JUVENILES 
Roper and Graham are the keys to understanding Justice 
Kennedy’s vision of childhood and the distinct qualities of 
children that differentiate them from adults.46 Quite possibly, the 
5-4 ruling in J.D.B. would have been different had the case 
been decided prior to Roper. Attaining majority in J.D.B. likely 
depended on Justice Kennedy’s vote, which no doubt influenced 
Justice Sotomayor’s opinion. Indeed, Kennedy’s opinions in 
Roper and Graham announced a jurisprudential approach to 
youth predicated on the belief that there are characteristics 
unique to juveniles that render them categorically distinct from 
adults.47 Both decisions follow a logical progression in terms of 
explaining how the biological and psychosocial development of 
youth can mitigate their culpability. The cases reveal evidence of 
Kennedy’s views on the objectivity of age.   
A. Roper v. Simmons  
In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the death 
penalty is a disproportionate punishment for persons under the 
age of eighteen, and therefore violates the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.48 The decision 
                                                          
46 See Tamar R. Birckhead, Graham v. Florida: Justice Kennedy’s Vision 
of Childhood and the Role of Judges, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 66, 
69–74 (2010). 
47 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (noting that children “are more vulnerable 
or susceptible to . . . outside pressures” than adults); see also Graham, 130 
S. Ct. at 2026 (“No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s 
observations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. As petitioner’s amici 
point out, developments in psychology and brain science continue to show 
fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”). 
48 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. Christopher Simmons proposed and 
committed burglary and murder by breaking and entering, tying up a victim, 
and throwing the victim off a bridge with the help of friends. Id. at 555–58. 
Simmons was sentenced to death at the age of seventeen. Id. at 558. The 
United States Supreme Court found that the execution of minors violated the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment” as applied 
to the states through the incorporation doctrine of the fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. at 578–79. 
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established that, as a categorical matter, juveniles are less 
culpable than adults and thus less deserving of the most severe 
punishment.49 The Court relied on social science research and 
common life experience in declaring the presence of “signature 
qualities of youth”50 to support its abolition of the death penalty 
for juveniles. The majority, therefore, held the view that age 
renders certain characteristics salient regardless of the particular 
idiosyncrasies of an individual child. Justice Sotomayor’s 
opinion in J.D.B. six years later reflects this sentiment:  
A child’s age, however, is different. Precisely because 
childhood yields objective conclusions like those we have 
drawn ourselves—among others, that children are “most 
susceptible to influence,” and “outside pressures”—
considering age in the custody analysis in no way 
involves a determination of how youth “subjectively 
affect[s] the mindset” of any particular child.51   
The first of these three salient characteristics is “[a] lack of 
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility . . . found 
in youth more often than in adults . . . .”52 The Court noted that 
“[t]hese qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered 
actions and decisions.”53 “In recognition of the comparative 
immaturity and irresponsibility of juveniles, almost every State 
prohibits those who are under 18 years of age from voting, 
serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent.”54 The 
second characteristic is the fact that “juveniles are more 
vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside 
pressures, including peer pressure”55 which the Court noted “is 
                                                          
49 Id. at 568–70. 
50 Id. at 570 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)). 
51 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404–05 (2011) (alteration 
in original) (citations omitted). 
52 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. 
Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
53 Id. (quoting Johnson, 509 U.S. at 367) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. (“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and 
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence . . . .” 
(alteration in the original) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 
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explained in part by the prevailing circumstance that juveniles 
have less control, or less experience with control, over their 
own environment.”56 Third, “the character of a juvenile is not as 
well formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of 
juveniles are more transitory, less fixed.”57   
The Court reasoned that, juvenile offenders, by virtue of 
these characteristics, are significantly less culpable than adults, 
even those who commit heinous acts of murder.58 To illustrate 
that the Court views these traits as universal, when pressed to 
reject a per se rule in favor of a case-by-case assessment of an 
individual defendant’s psychological and social maturity, the 
Court responded that “[t]he differences between juvenile and 
adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk 
allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite 
insufficient culpability.”59  
B. Graham v. Florida  
Five years after Roper v. Simmons, the Court considered 
whether sentencing persons who committed non-homicide 
offenses before age eighteen to a life sentence without the 
possibility of parole violated the Eighth Amendment. Relying 
heavily on Roper, Graham v. Florida answered that question in 
the affirmative, protecting an entire class of offenders from 
receiving determinate life sentences.60 In the majority opinion, 
once again led by Justice Kennedy, the Court observed that a 
life without parole sentence and a death sentence share defining 
characteristics—the denial of all hope and certainty that 
redemption will not change one’s mortal fate or destiny.61 For 
instance, the Court observed that, even if a state does not 
                                                          
(1982))). 
56 Id.  
57 Id. at 570. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 572–73. 
60 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010) (holding that the 
Eighth Amendment “prohibits the imposition of a life without parole sentence 
on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide”). 
61 Id. at 2027. 
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execute an offender, life without parole is an irrevocable 
forfeiture of the duration of one’s life.62 The Court found that 
sentencing a juvenile to life without parole was unusually harsh 
because it denied the youth any chance for redemption.63   
Once again, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, found 
that specific immutable characteristics of youth require their 
categorical exclusion from a particular punishment.64 Graham v. 
Florida bolsters Roper’s findings about youth by acknowledging 
that scientific research has furthered our understanding of the 
cognitive differences (variations in reasoning and understanding) 
and psychosocial differences (disparities in social and emotional 
functioning) between juveniles and adults.65 Graham is a logical 
extension of Justice Kennedy’s approach in Roper, finding that 
the well-documented and understood traits of adolescence 
mitigate a youth’s culpability.66 In other words, by virtue of age 
alone, a juvenile’s culpability cannot be equal to that of an 
adult.67 Graham carries Roper’s rationale regarding the general 
                                                          
62 See id. at 2028 (“[If sentenced to life without parole], a juvenile 
offender will on average serve more years of his life in prison than an adult 
offender.”). 
63 Id. at 2028–30. Graham, who was sixteen years old at the time of the 
first offense, received probation after a plea deal for attempting to rob a 
restaurant with friends. Id. at 2018. While on probation for that offense, he 
was later arrested again. Id. The court gave him the maximum possible 
sentence for violating his probation by committing a home invasion robbery, 
possessing a firearm, and associating with persons engaged in criminal 
activity. Id. at 2020. Graham was given life without parole. Id.  
64 Id. at 2026 (“Juveniles are more capable of change than are 
adults . . . .”). 
65 Id. Though cognitive abilities vary widely among individuals, legal 
precedent has accepted the well-established social science research that 
children process information differently than adults, and their judgments and 
perceptions reflect orientations associated with adolescence. See Steinberg, L. 
et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults? Minor’s Access to Abortion, 
the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA “Flip-Flop,” 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 583–97 (2009); see also Bishop & Farber, supra note 15, at 
149 (citing Elizabeth Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence, 
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 160–64 (1997)). 
66 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–27. 
67 Id. at 2027 (“It follows that, when compared to an adult murderer, a 
juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished 
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character of a juvenile’s psychosocial immaturity and cognitive 
abilities68 a step further by articulating additional distinctions 
between adults and juveniles in the context of the penological 
goals. Graham points out that because of a juvenile’s “limited 
understanding of the criminal justice system,” their “mistrust 
[of] adults,” and their tendency toward impulsive decision 
making, “they are less likely . . . to work effectively with their 
lawyers to aid in their own defense.”69   
Society is replete with laws that disqualify a minor from 
engaging in particular conduct because of the unique 
vulnerabilities of children. For instance, there are laws that 
restrict children from marrying,70 entering into binding 
contracts,71 possessing alcohol,72 and serving in the armed 
forces,73 to name just a few.74 Once a child reaches the age of 
majority, the justification for these protections becomes obsolete, 
because they rest on the objective characteristics of childhood. 
While there may be some children whose capacity to negotiate a 
                                                          
moral culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the crime each 
bear on the analysis.”). 
68 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
69 Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
70 Brief for Am. Ass’n of Jewish Lawyers & Jurists et al. as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (No. 08-7412), 
2009 WL 2236776, at *9 (“All fifty states have established minimum age 
requirements to vote, marry, join the military, obtain a driver’s license, and 
consume alcohol.”). 
71 Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Wis. 1968) 
(“The law governing agreements made during infancy reaches back over 
many centuries. The general rule is that ‘the contract of a minor, other than 
for necessaries, is either void or voidable at his option.’” (citations omitted) 
(quoting Grauman, Marx & Cline Co. v. Krienitz, 126 N.W. 50, 52 (Wis. 
1910))). 
72 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302 (2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-
4 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 658 (2010). 
73 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-3 (2011); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 1805/1 (2011); N.Y. MIL. LAW § 2 (McKinney 1990). 
74 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) 
(“[L]imits on children’s legal capacity under the common law ‘secure them 
from hurting themselves by their own improvident acts.’” (quoting 1 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 464–65 
(Oxford, Claredon Press 1765)). 
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contract or perform in military operations would exceed that of 
an adult, society nonetheless assigns prohibitions according to 
age—an objective factor that applies evenly to every minor 
regardless of her skill level or precociousness. 
The relevance of social norms and legal standards based on 
minority played an important role in the Court’s decisions 
regarding whether juveniles can be subject to the most severe 
punishments.75 In Roper and Graham, the Court considered the 
appropriateness of the death penalty and life without parole, 
respectively, for non-homicide offenses committed by minors.76 
The stark contrast between prohibiting a minor from marrying 
due to his immaturity, but subjecting him to the death penalty 
despite his age, underscores a paradox present in our criminal 
justice system.77 In part, the abolition of the death penalty and 
life without parole is recognition that characteristics of youth are 
universal. Specifically, because laws disqualify children, as a 
class, from certain activities based on the belief that they lack 
mature judgment, it follows that they should be protected from 
the harshest criminal sanctions.78 
III. ROPER AND GRAHAM EXTEND BEYOND THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT CONTEXT 
Roper and Graham have had a profound impact on Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and both of these decisions have 
contributed greatly to the field of juvenile justice. Many scholars 
have written about the application of Roper and Graham to areas 
                                                          
75 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–70 (2005). 
76 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–70; Brief for American Ass’n of Jewish 
Lawyers & Jurists et al., supra note 70, at *9–14. 
77 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. Almost every state has laws that 
distinguish youth from adults “[i]n recognition of the comparative immaturity 
and irresponsibility of juveniles.” Id. The distinction made by states is among 
several factors demonstrating “that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability 
be classified among the worst offenders” for which the death penalty is 
reserved. Id. at 553. 
78 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010); Roper, 543 
U.S. at 568–70. 
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of jurisprudence other than the Eighth Amendment.79 
Practitioners and academics alike have recognized that Roper 
and Graham constitute a new jurisprudential approach that 
accounts for the uniqueness of youth in protecting and delivering 
constitutional rights to juveniles. Collectively, Roper and 
Graham are evidence that the current Supreme Court is 
committed to ensuring that “youth” is treated as a mitigating 
rather than an aggravating factor.80 The Court’s recognition of a 
juvenile’s psychosocial immaturity and cognitive functioning as 
it relates to punishment left open the question of whether these 
same findings would be equally relevant to other constitutional 
protections. J.D.B. answered that question in the context of 
police interrogation.   
A. J.D.B. v. North Carolina 
In 2005, a police detective from the Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina Police Department arrived at Smith Middle School to 
                                                          
79 See Bishop & Farber, supra note 15; Tamar R. Birckhead, Juvenile 
Justice Reform 2.0, 20 J.L. & POL’Y 79 (2011) [hereinafter Birckhead, 
Juvenile Justice] (“[R]ecent Supreme Court decisions ending the juvenile 
death penalty and juvenile life without parole sentences for non-homicides, 
and holding that a child’s age properly informs the Miranda custody analysis, 
could lead to significant change in both the juvenile and criminal justice 
systems for young offenders.”); Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the Child: 
Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
385, 386 (2008) (“[T]he principal bases of Simmons [should] be applied to 
the area of juvenile interrogation.”); Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80 MISS. L.J. 1035, 1094 
n.169 (2011) (citing Roper and Graham to show that the court recognizes 
fundamental differences between adults and children, and may recognize that 
children and adult generations currently have different expectations of 
privacy); Levick, supra note 12; Elizabeth Locker, Grow Up Georgia . . . It's 
Time to Treat Our Children As Children, 4 J. MARSHALL L.J. 85, 87 (2011) 
(citing Roper and Graham to advocate for juvenile delinquency jurisdiction 
for all persons under eighteen, regardless of the crime). Currently, “Georgia 
law generally limits delinquency jurisdiction to children under seventeen and 
further identifies seven felonies that, if a child as young as thirteen is alleged 
to have committed, are excluded from original juvenile court jurisdiction.” 
Id. 
80 See Birckhead, supra note 46, at 79. 
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interview a student about a stolen digital camera.81 The camera 
was found in the school and was one of several items stolen 
from two recent residential break-ins.82 The detective believed 
that J.D.B., a 13 year old special education student in the 
seventh grade, had stolen the camera from a neighbor’s house.83 
A school police officer escorted J.D.B. from his classroom to a 
conference room where he was met by the assistant principal, 
her assistant, and the juvenile detective doing the investigation.84  
After J.D.B. entered the conference room, the door was 
closed behind him.85 In the presence of the administrators, the 
detective asked J.D.B. to explain where he had been at the time 
that the break-ins occurred.86 J.D.B. confirmed that he was in 
the neighborhood then, but informed the police that he had been 
looking for work.87 The detective pressed J.D.B. further and 
pulled out the stolen camera.88 Eventually, J.D.B. confessed to 
breaking into his neighbor’s house and stealing the camera.89 He 
wrote a full statement detailing the theft.90 By this time, roughly 
forty-five minutes had passed since the interrogation had 
begun.91  
Except for one statement encouraging J.D.B. to tell the 
truth, the school administrators were present but silent 
throughout the interrogation.92 Instead, the police detective 
conducted all the questioning.93 J.D.B’s grandmother, his legal 
guardian, was not notified about the questioning.94 It was only 
after J.D.B. admitted to stealing the camera that the detective 
                                                          
81 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2399 (2011). 
82 Id.  
83 Id.  





89 Id. at 2400. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 2399. 
92 Id. 
93 See id. 2399–400. 
94 Id. at 2399. 
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told him he did not have to speak to him and that he was free to 
leave.95 However, no Miranda warnings were given.96 
The detective used the confession and the written statement 
to obtain a search warrant for J.D.B.’s home.97 After police 
retrieved the other stolen items, they ultimately charged J.D.B. 
with one count of breaking and entering and one count of 
larceny.98 The trial court denied J.D.B’s motion to suppress his 
statements made during the interrogation, saying that his 
statements were voluntary and that he was not in custody, and 
the intermediate appellate court affirmed.99 The North Carolina 
Supreme Court upheld both the trial court decision and the 
intermediate appellate court.100 The Court rested its finding on 
the characteristics of the school environment as generally 
restrictive in regard to all students, and therefore the 
interrogation was not satisfactorily custodial to meet the purpose 
for which Miranda warnings were designed.101 The North 
Carolina Supreme Court’s reasoning would make it virtually 
impossible for a judge to find that a student interrogated in a 
school setting is ever in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
B. Roper and Graham Meet Miranda 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina approached the question of age and 
its relevance to the Miranda custody analysis relying on past 
precedent, social science, and common sense.102 As Justice 
Sotomayor opined, common sense conclusions about behavior 
                                                          
95 Id. at 2400. 
96 Id. at 2399. 
97 See In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d 135, 136–37 (N.C. 2009), rev’d sub 
nom., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
98 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2400. 
99 Id. 
100 In re J.D.B., 686 S.E.2d at 136. 
101 Id. at 138 (“The uniquely structured nature of the school environment 
inherently deprives students of some freedom of action. However, the typical 
restrictions of the school setting apply to all students and do not constitute a 
“significant” deprivation of freedom of action . . . .”). 
102 See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2394. 
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and perception may be based upon age.103 One need not possess 
a degree in child development to appreciate that children behave 
and perceive events differently from adults.104   
It is no coincidence then that the J.D.B. Court began its 
explanation of the relevance of age to the Miranda custody test 
with a recitation of cases affirming the inherently coercive 
atmosphere of an interrogation.105 The test for custody under 
Miranda limits itself to consideration of objective circumstances 
in determining how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position 
would understand his freedom to end the questioning and 
leave.106 Relying upon the general characteristics of children, the 
Court found that police officers and judges can consider age 
without “doing any damage to the objective nature of the 
custody analysis.”107 As Miranda recognized, “the very fact of 
custodial interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty 
and trades on the weakness of individuals,”108 and weaknesses 
could not be more evident than in children.   
J.D.B. is replete with references to Roper and Graham, 
among other cases, to explain why age is relevant to the 
Miranda custody analysis. Specifically, the Court noted that a 
juvenile’s susceptibility and vulnerability to external pressures is 
equally relevant to a child’s perception of whether he is free to 
terminate the interrogation, and that coercive interrogation 
techniques used on children increase the potential for false 
confessions.109 Borrowing from Roper, Graham, and other 
Supreme Court precedent, the Court explained that a reasonable 
child subjected to police questioning would sometimes feel 
pressured to submit when his or her adult counterpart would 
                                                          
103 Id. at 2407. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 2401 (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 435 
(2000); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). 
106 Id. at 2402 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)). 
107 Id. at 2403. 
108 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966). 
109 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2401 (citing Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. 
Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post–DNA World, 82 N.C. L. 
REV. 891, 906–07 (2004)). 
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not.110 In light of a child’s deference to authority, a juvenile 
suspect is likely to feel he must comply with a police officer’s 
request to talk to him, especially where he is surrounded by 
school personnel in the principal’s office.111 For instance, a child 
in a situation like J.D.B.’s would almost certainly perceive his 
circumstances differently from how an adult in the same 
situation might. As the J.D.B. Court noted,  
[t]he effect of the schoolhouse cannot be disentangled 
from the identity of the person questioned. A student—
whose presence at school is compulsory and whose 
disobedience at school is cause for disciplinary action—is 
in a far different position than say, a parent volunteer on 
school grounds to chaperone an event, or an adult from 
the community on school grounds to attend a basketball 
game. Without asking whether the person “questioned in 
school” is a “minor,” . . . the coercive effect of the 
schoolhouse setting is unknowable.112   
Likewise, scientific findings about the adolescent tendency to 
emphasize short-term gains while minimizing long-term 
consequences113 provide insight into a juvenile suspect’s decision 
to cooperate with police and submit to an interrogation. Some 
youth are likely to submit to questioning for the purpose of 
fulfilling a desire to go home, even if that results in detention, 
                                                          
110 Id. at 2403 (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 
(1994)). 
111 Id. at 2405. 
112 Id. 
113 See Christine Holdeman et al., Roper v. Simmons the Death Penalty 
Was Banned for Juvenile Offenders, 35 LINCOLN L. REV. 43, 79 (2008) 
(discussing how scientists have shown that while adolescents perform cost-
benefit analyses, they skew this balance by emphasizing short-term results 
and discounting future consequences more than adults do); Elizabeth S. 
Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 233 (1995) (discussing research that indicates 
developmental influences lead youthful decision makers and adults to differ in 
“the subjective value they attach to various perceived consequences in the 
process of making choices . . . .”); Laurence Steinberg et al., Age 
Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80 CHILD DEV. 
28–44 (2009) (researchers found differences in future orientation and the 
ability to delay rewards among adolescents of various ages as well as adults). 
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rather than invoking their rights out of concern for their best 
legal interests.114 At first blush, this may seem applicable only to 
the waiver of Miranda rights, but in fact a youth’s tendency 
toward impetuous decision making for short term gratification 
may permit police to rely on less authoritative conduct to 
achieve compliance, which is relevant to the custody inquiry. 
The characteristics unique to adolescent brain development and 
psychosocial development make a juvenile’s perception of a 
restraint on his freedom fundamentally distinct from an adult’s 
perception of that restraint. As Sotomayor explained, “[n]either 
officers nor courts can reasonably evaluate the effect of 
objective circumstances that, by their nature, are specific to 
children without accounting for the age of the child . . . .”115 
These truths are self-evident and draw their source from 
normative experiences—whether it be childhood or parenthood, 
or perhaps both.116  
In both Graham and J.D.B., the government argued for 
alternatives that would deny adolescents different protections. 
The government, in Graham, argued that because states, 
including Florida, account for a juvenile offender’s age when 
determining whether to prosecute in adult criminal court or in 
juvenile court, there is no need to exclude juveniles from life 
without parole sentences categorically.117 The government 
                                                          
114 See Saul M. Kassin & Gisli Gudjonsson, The Psychology of 
Confessions: A Review of the Literature and the Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
PUB. INT. 33, 52 (2004) (citing to a 1981 study that found most juveniles 
who waived their Miranda rights did so because they wanted to be released); 
see also Laurence Steinberg, Juveniles on Trial: MacArthur Foundation Study 
Calls Competency into Question, CRIM. JUST. MAG., Fall 2003, at 20, 23 
(discussing findings that adolescents are more willing than adults to confess, 
“especially if they believe it will result in . . . going home.”). 
115 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2405. 
116 See id. at 2407 (“[A] child’s age, when known or apparent, is hardly 
an obscure factor to assess. . . . [O]fficers and judges need no imaginative 
powers, knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive 
science, or expertise in social and cultural anthropology to account for a 
child’s age. They simply need the common sense to know that a 7–year–old 
is not a 13–year–old and neither is an adult.”). 
117 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010) (“[T]he State 
argues that the laws of Florida and other States governing criminal procedure 
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contended that a state’s sentencing discretion was ample to 
ensure fair sentencing procedure.118 The Graham Court held 
otherwise, echoing its reasoning in Roper that the differences 
between juveniles and adults are so “marked and well 
understood” that they require a categorical rule that a juvenile 
cannot be sentenced to life without parole.119   
In J.D.B., the government argued that because a suspect’s 
age is considered under the voluntariness test of the Due Process 
Clause, age is adequately accounted for when considering the 
admissibility of the defendant’s statement.120 Just as the Graham 
Court rejected the state’s charging scheme argument, the J.D.B. 
Court rejected efforts to keep age out of the Miranda custody 
analysis.121 Both Graham and J.D.B. reject alternatives to non-
categorical rules about age when the result has the potential to 
undermine the constitutional protections afforded to juveniles.122 
Both decisions find that age is relevant to ensure adherence to 
separate, but equally important, constitutional considerations.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF J.D.B. FOR SECURING MEANINGFUL DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS FOR JUVENILES  
When children are held to a “reasonable adult standard” to 
assess whether their constitutional rights were violated, they are 
denied adequate protection under the law. To ignore the real 
differences between adults and children fails to ensure the 
procedural safeguards Gault intended. A child’s constitutional 
                                                          
take sufficient account of the age of a juvenile offender.”). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. at 2032. 
120 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2408. 
121 Id. at 2406 (“The State and its amici offer numerous reasons that 
courts must blind themselves to a juvenile defendant’s age. None is 
persuasive.”). 
122 See Birckhead, supra note 46, at 71 (“In both opinions [Roper and 
Graham] Justice Kennedy concluded that a case-by-case approach could not 
reliably separate out those juveniles with the capacity for change; only a 
categorical rule that drew a bright line between childhood and adulthood was 
sufficient to avoid the imposition of punishment disproportionate to the 
crime.”). 
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rights should be delivered and protected in ways commensurate 
with the well-settled understanding about characteristics of 
youth.123 J.D.B., the latest case in the developing body of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on youth status, has the potential 
to reshape the way the law secures constitutional rights for 
juveniles. The Court distinguished age from “other personal 
characteristics that, even when known to police, have no 
objectively discernible relationship to a reasonable person’s 
understanding of his freedom of action.”124 Future cases will 
determine whether the standard being applied adequately 
accounts for the immutable characteristics of youth.  
Scholars will opine on the various ramifications of J.D.B. 
over the coming months and perhaps years. Although the 
breadth and depth of that subject is beyond the scope of this 
Article, this Part sketches a few areas of juvenile justice that are 
ripe for reconsideration after J.D.B. Specifically, waiver of right 
to counsel, Terry stops of juveniles, and the attorney-client 
relationship are areas in which an adolescent’s normal 
developmental impairments may dictate a different analytical 
framework in which to evaluate whether children are being 
provided the full scope of procedural safeguards to which they 
are entitled.   
In the wake of Roper, Graham, and J.D.B., the deleterious 
practice of children waiving counsel at arraignment and 
proceeding pro se should be curtailed. Research indicates that 
waiver of counsel is significantly higher among juveniles than 
adults.125 The well-founded belief that a juvenile’s lack of 
                                                          
123 Roper, Graham and J.D.B. affirm the fundamental differences 
between adults and children and pave the way for juvenile and criminal 
justice reform. See Birckhead, Juvenile Justice, supra note 79, at 19–20 
(discussing the extent and limitations of the juvenile justice reforms these 
decisions could facilitate); see also Emily Buss, Failing Juvenile Courts, and 
What Lawyers and Judges Can Do About It, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 318, 
332 (2011) (discussing how proposed dramatic juvenile justice reform would 
not require a substantial change in the law or policy of the juvenile court). 
124 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2404. 
125 See Hillary B. Farber, Do You Swear to Tell the Truth, the Whole 
Truth, and Nothing but the Truth Against Your Child?, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
551, 570 n.95 (2010). 
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maturity and sense of responsibility causes him or her to make 
impetuous and ill-considered decisions is equally relevant to 
challenging the validity of a juvenile’s uncounseled waiver of 
representation. A child’s lack of appreciation for long term 
consequences impairs his or her ability to make sound decisions 
regarding legal strategy, perhaps most significant is the waiver 
of one’s right to counsel. A 2006 study by the National Juvenile 
Defender Center estimates that up to seventy-five percent of 
juveniles in some counties in Florida waive their right to counsel 
in delinquency proceedings.126 Other states such as Virginia, 
Ohio, and Georgia had waiver of counsel rates as high as fifty to 
ninety percent in certain counties.127   
The “commonsense conclusions about behavior and 
perception”128 that the Court categorically applied to youth in 
J.D.B. are equally applicable in the Fourth Amendment context. 
Accordingly, the legal rubric used to assess a Terry stop of a 
juvenile is ripe for reconsideration after J.D.B. Under Terry and 
its progeny, not every police encounter with a civilian implicates 
                                                          
126 See PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, NAT’L JUVENILE 
DEFENDER CTR., FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL & 
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 27–28 (2006), 
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%20Assessment.pdf. 
127 See AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., GEORGIA: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 1 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 2001), available at 
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/georgia.pdf (in some jurisdictions, up to ninety 
percent of children waive the right to counsel in delinquency proceedings); 
AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. ET AL., JUSTICE CUT SHORT: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN OHIO 25 (Kim Brooks et al. eds., 2003), 
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Ohio_Assessment.pdf (up to eighty 
percent waiver rate in some jurisdictions); AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE 
CTR. ET AL., VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND 
QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 23 (Patricia 
Puritz et al. eds., 2002), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Virginia% 
20Assessment.pdf (more than fifty percent waived the right to counsel in one 
jurisdiction); PURITZ & CRAWFORD, supra note 126 (up to seventy-five 
percent waive the right to counsel in some Florida jurisdictions). 
128 J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 
U.S. 652, 674 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
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the Fourth Amendment.129 Police officers may question civilians 
without the encounter amounting to a “seizure” if a reasonable 
person in that situation would feel he was free to walk away.130 
Thus, in such instances, an individual’s participation is viewed 
as consensual. However, that same police-civilian encounter will 
implicate the Fourth Amendment if a reasonable person would 
not feel free to leave.”131 The fact that adults and children 
perceive their relationship with authority differently is well 
settled after J.D.B.132 The way that juveniles think, reason, and 
relate to authority figures implies that a youth might not 
understand nor appreciate his right to walk away from an officer 
and therefore be subject to police questioning during a 
“consensual encounter.”133 Thus, placed in stressful situations, 
young people are more deferential to authority.134 For most 
                                                          
129 Whether an encounter constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment 
purposes rests on the level of restraint exercised by the police. See United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1980); Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 16 (1968).  
130 See Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct 1319, 1326 (1983); Mendenhall, 446 
U.S. at 554; Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.  
131 Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. 
132 See J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 (“[A] reasonable child subjected to 
police questioning will sometimes feel pressured to submit when a reasonable 
adult would feel free to go.”). 
133 See e.g. People v. Lopez, 892 N.E.2d 1047, 1061 (Ill. 2008) (“When 
assessing whether a juvenile was seized for purposes of the fourth 
amendment, [it is appropriate to] . . . modify the reasonable person standard 
to consider whether a reasonable juvenile would have thought that his 
freedom of movement was restricted.”); see also Lourdes M. Rosado, Minors 
and the Fourth Amendment: How Juvenile Status Should Invoke Different 
Standards for Searches and Seizures on the Street, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 
794 (1996). 
134 See Barry Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study 
of Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 230 (2006) 
(citing Gerald P. Koocher, Different Lenses: Psycho-Legal Perspectives on 
Children’s Rights, 16 NOVA L. REV. 711, 716 (1992)) (noting that children 
are socialized to obey authority figures); Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ 
Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of Adolescents’ and Adults’ 
Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV., 333–63 (2003) 
(psychosocial characteristics such as compliance with authority, risk 
appraisal, and future orientation were found to influence adolescents’ decision 
making in three different legal scenarios: confessing to police, accepting a 
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people, young or old, questioning by police of suspected 
criminal activity is stressful. Juveniles often feel they must 
comply with requests and answer truthfully.135 While adults may 
be more likely to invoke their right to walk away when it would 
be in their self-interest, the cognitive, emotional, and social 
development of a youth may well render a different response. 
Failure to consider the “youth status” of the defendant illustrates 
the gap in Fourth Amendment protection. Logically, it follows 
from J.D.B. that an assessment of whether a reasonable person 
in the defendant’s position would have felt free to leave must 
include age as a relevant factor.136   
The unique needs of children raise a conundrum for many 
lawyers who represent children.137 The Court noted in Graham 
                                                          
plea agreement, and disclosing to an attorney); Marty Beyer, Immaturity, 
Culpability & Competence of Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, CRIM. JUST. 
MAG., Summer 2000, at 26, 29 (arguing that because of their immature 
thought processes, juveniles do not believe they have a choice when talking 
to the police). 
 135 See Beyer, supra note 134, at 29. 
136 Some states and federal courts do include age in the Terry 
determination. See e.g., United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1505 n.7 
(10th Cir. 1994) (“Of course age, gender, education and intelligence may be 
relevant in any particular case, to the extent they are objectively 
apparent.”). In a 1983 claim where a sixteen-year-old girl claimed wrongful 
seizure, the Tenth Circuit took age into account by viewing her “encounter 
through the eyes of a reasonable sixteen-year-old.” Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 
1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2005). Two concurring judges in In re J.M. concluded 
“that the majority’s application of the hypothetical ‘reasonable person’ test 
for adults to a child is misconceived.” In re J.M., 619 A.2d 497, 504 (D.C. 
1992). Even before J.D.B., the concurring justices considered characteristics 
of youth when they noted that a reasonable child test would ensure 
that “young citizens are not denied constitutional protection by reason of their 
age and immaturity.” Id. at 506. J.D.B. made it clear that consideration of a 
suspect’s age would not require “anticipating the idiosyncrasies” or the 
subjective state of mind of the person being interrogated by police. J.D.B., 
131 S. Ct. at 2402. 
137 See Laura Cohen & Randi Mandelbaum, Kids Will Be Kids: Creating 
a Framework for Interviewing and Counseling Adolescent Clients, 79 TEMP. 
L. REV. 357, 358 (2006) (“The challenge for lawyers who represent young 
people age twelve and over is clear: Can we create a paradigm for legal 
interviewing and counseling that affords these clients the autonomy that the 
ethical rules—and, one might argue, moral obligations—demand, but, at the 
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that the features that distinguish juveniles from adults make them 
less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers to 
aid in their defense.”138 The Roper, Graham, J.D.B. trilogy 
provides support for tailoring the attorney-client relationship to 
the unique needs of juvenile clients. A juvenile’s lack of 
experience and judgment may create a greater risk of not 
understanding the role of defense counsel, the long-term 
consequences of their legal decisions, or the concept of the 
attorney-client privilege. 139 It may take more time to educate the 
juvenile client on his options and subsequently have the client 
direct the goals of representation.140 Children may require more 
time building a rapport and trust with their attorney than an 
adult client in the same situation. 141 In order to help young 
clients understand their choices and the legal process, lawyers 
need to simplify concepts and have more frequent discussions 
with clients that reinforce the long term consequences of their 
decisions.  
Roper and Graham only considered juvenile distinctions 
under the Eighth Amendment. J.D.B. applied that same line of 
reasoning to the Miranda custody analysis. Together, these cases 
have far-reaching implications on how youth status can be 
applied in substantive and procedural criminal jurisprudence. 
For instance, every area of criminal law that uses a “reasonable 
                                                          
same time, compensates for their immature decision-making abilities?” 
(citations omitted)). 
138 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010). Characteristics 
attributable to children such as impetuous decision making and mistrust of 
authority figures pose obstacles to the attorney-client relationship. See id. 
139 See Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and Rights: Client 
Counseling Theory and the Role of Child’s Counsel in Delinquency Cases, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 259 (2005) (“[R]eal cognitive and psychosocial 
limitations among children and adolescents continue to frustrate the 
relationship between the attorney and his child client.”). 
140 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2011) (“[A] 
lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to 
the means by which they are to be pursued.”). 
141 PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A 
CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY 
OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 50 (1995).  
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person” standard creates an opportunity for the establishment of 
a “reasonable child” standard.142 Likewise, when a police officer 
attains tangible evidence via a consent search, consideration for 
whether the child legally consented should be determined 
according to whether a “reasonable child” would have greater 
difficulty knowingly and voluntarily consenting to a search. The 
next big set of questions addresses the degree to which courts 
approach the application of criminal procedure and criminal law 
differently as applied to the age of the accused. 
CONCLUSION 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina is the first time the Court 
addressed the relevance of age in determining custody for 
Miranda purposes. Much rests on the result. The decision has 
the potential to reinvigorate the spirit of In re Gault.143 The 
intent of the Court in Gault was to provide greater due process 
protections for youth.144 The decision paved the way for 
procedural justice for juveniles in the delinquency context.145 For 
its part, J.D.B. has the potential to bring due process rights for 
juveniles into the twenty-first century by ensuring consideration 
of youth in the investigation and adjudication phases of the 
prosecution of a juvenile. 
                                                          
142 See Levick, supra note 12, at 756 (“Examples abound where the 
characteristics of youth might dictate a different view of the ‘reasonableness’ 
of the defendant’s conduct, his capacity or mental state, or otherwise require 
different treatment of youth. These include such matters as self-defense, 
duress, provocation, negligent or reckless homicide, voluntariness of waivers 
of rights, arrest and intent generally, strict liability and accomplice liability, 
and jury instructions. Many of these purport to ascribe blame or degree of 
blame, or to determine outcomes, on the basis of either an objective test or a 
test with both subjective and objective components.”).  
143 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
144 Id. at 1, 6 (holding that juvenile proceedings must comply with the 
Fourteenth Amendment, giving juveniles the right to notice of charges, to 
counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and to privilege 
against self-incrimination). 
145 Id. at 1. 
